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ABSTRACT 
 
Our study confirms that the financial constraints to SME’s growth tend to appear as an excess of 
sensibility of the investment expenditures on firm’s cash flow. Through the application of dynamic 
panel data techniques to an extended version of Eulero’s investment equation of a sample of Italian 
SMEs, the analysis shows that the growth of the subsample of the small firms in backward regions 
of Italy is more constrained by inside finance than that of firms in more developed regions. This is 
because the typical information opacity of SMEs is worsened here by the unsatisfactory 
development of financial markets. Moreover, our analysis ascertains that the small firms can 
significantly relax the constraints if they are able to establish a close relationship with the banks 
making easier the access of bank to firm’s information.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is generally accepted that the availability of finance is one of the main factors affecting the 
ability of firms to grow. Especially in small and young firms, growth appears constrained by the 
quantity of internally generated resources. Furthermore, where financial markets are poorly 
developed, the gap between outside and inside finance widens since firms find it more difficult to 
access outside finance. The obstacles to firms tapping outside finance can be partly overcome by 
improving bank access to company information, hence establishing a close relationship. 
Our study aims not only to ascertain that the growth of small firms in backward regions is more 
financially constrained by inside finance than that of firms in more developed regions, but also that 
close relationships between firms and banks raise the ability of firms to finance their growth with 
outside resources. Our analysis falls within the field of investment literature which is known to deal 
with problems related the financing of firm growth and the effects of financial constraints as 
measured by the investment/cash flow relationship. Excess sensitivity of investment expenditures to 
cash flow means that a firm’s growth is financially constrained because it is strictly dependent on 
the ability to generate internal resources for its own financing. 
For our investigation we apply dynamic panel data techniques to an extended Euler investment 
equation. We are interested to analyze the issues related to sensitivity of the investment 
expenditures to cash flow with reference to the first half of the last decade. Nevertheless, our 
analysis goes back to the previous years in order to introduce some cyclical evaluations and to 
capture some dynamics. Therefore, our dataset is formed by two distinct samples of Italian small 
and medium sized enterprises obtained from surveys of Italian manufacturing firms published by 
Italian private banks in accordance to the Italian Ministry of Industry. The dataset for the period 
1998-2006 is divided into two balanced samples referring to the six-year periods 1998-2003 and 
2001-2006. In this period the Italian banking system emerged from major reorganization managed 
by the monetary authority. This process aimed explicitly to make it possible for the national banks 
to face the increasing competition by the European banks following the integration of EU financial 
markets.  
The consolidation of the national banking system occurred through an upsizing process and 
M&A operations to the detriment of regional banks in southern Italy. This caused the full 
disappearance of the large regional banks which had previously played a key role in supporting the 
growth of the backward regions in southern Italy. This reorganization led to an improvement in 
efficiency but it ended up with the financial requirements for regional growth depending on smaller 
local banks. 
This period coincided with the end of the positive trend of sustained export-driven growth. There 
is an inversion of the cycle, leading to a sharp fall in exports and production. This is when the real 
financial difficulties started for the Italian SMEs, prior to the explosion of the financial crisis in the 
years to come. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the main questions 
about the nexus between financial constraints, relationship lending and firm growth. Section 3 is 
devoted to explaining the methodological approach and the empirical data. In section 4 after 
discussing some features both of the capital structure and of relationship banking of the sample 
firms, we then present the findings of the econometric exercises. Some concluding remarks are 
contained in the final section. Finally, there is an appendix showing Euler’s investment equation.      
 
 
2. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND FIRM GROWTH 
 
The literature on the capital structure-growth nexus deals with the problems about the sources of 
financing of production and the financial constraints to the growth of the firm. Our analysis is 
concerned not only with the framework of the Modigliani-Miller propositions according to which 
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capital structure does not matter for a firm’s growth but also with the hierarchy hypothesis 
according to which external finance is not a perfect substitute for internal finance and inside 
resources are preferred in order to finance firm growth. 
Starting with the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988), this literature has sought to ascertain 
whether there is a positive relationship between a firm’s investment expenditures and its cash flow. 
According to this approach, great sensitivity of a firm’s investment to inside finance indicates that 
there are financial constraints to the firm’s growth. Much was later written to confirm this 
relationship, estimating empirical models where the investment function is adjusted by proxies of 
the capital structure, especially by cash flow variables1. Since a positive relationship between 
investment spending and cash flow can prove the existence both of financial constraints or of good 
opportunities for firm’s growth, most analyses have confirmed this relationship, showing that the 
investment spending in the sample of the firms classified as ex-ante “financially constrained” is 
more sensitive to cash flow (amongst others, Devereux, Schiantarelli, 1989; Hoshi et al., 1991, 
Oliner, Rudebusch, 1992; Schaller, 1993; Himmelberg, Petersen, 1994; Gilchrist, Himmelberg, 
1995; Fazzari et al., 2000)2. 
This approach has been strongly questioned by the latest empirical research beginning with that 
of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). According to this analysis, the relationship between investment and 
cash flow does not necessarily prove that financial constraints are binding. On the contrary, capital 
expenditure will be systematically sensitive to cash flow because the user cost of outside finance is 
always higher. Therefore, sensitivity to cash flow will be higher for “financially non-constrained” 
firms than for the financially constrained because the former hold larger internal resources. Other 
works have confirmed this conclusion (amongst others, Kadapakkam et al. 1998; Cleary, 1999; 
Kaplan, Zingales, 2000; Gomes, 2001; Ati, 2003; Moyen, 2004). 
The matter of the “linearity” of the investment-cash flow relationship is largely unresolved3. 
Nevertheless there are many reasons suggesting that small firms face higher financial constraints 
because the opacity of the relationship of the firm with the financial markets raises difficulties to 
access outside resources. Many empirical studies have confirmed this thesis, showing that the 
growth of small firms is more sensitive to inside finance compared to larger firms (amongst others, 
Oliner Rudebusch, 1992; Westhead, Storey, 1997; Cress, Olofsson, 1997; Audresch, Elston, 2002). 
By the same token it can be said that the bottlenecks of the resource flows devoted to finance 
growth are highly likely both if the firm’s performance is negative and if the financial markets are 
not fully developed. Consequently, the dependence of a firm’s growth upon inside finance becomes 
even stronger (Bagella et al., 2001; Becchetti, Trovato, 2002; Bond et al., 2003; Sarno, 2005, 2008; 
Oliveira, Fortunato, 2006; Becchetti et al., 2009). 
There appears to be a broad consensus that relationship lending is the best practice to relax 
financial constraints. Since the work of Diamond (1984), greater benefits which mitigate the 
information asymmetries have been assigned to the relationship lending approach as opposed to 
transaction-based lending. Through relationship lending the bank establishes a long-term 
                                                 
1
 The paper by Hubbard (1998) reviews this literature. 
 
2
  In order to distinguish between ex-ante constrained and non-constrained firms several dummies for financial 
decisions have been used. In the initial works involving samples of larger firms the criterion discriminating between 
constrained and unconstrained firms lies in the dividend policy. The choice is inspired by finance theory according to 
which dividend payments are subordinated to investment policy; consequently firms with good opportunities distribute 
low dividends in order to finance their investments if they are financially constrained compared to firms with large 
funds and paying higher dividends.  
     
3
 The controversy continues. In the last work by Fazzari et al. (2000) the conclusions proposed by Kaplan and Zingales 
are contested; they say that the sample used in the analysis by Kaplan and Zingales is too small. In reply the latter 
(Kaplan, Zingales, 2000) restate their arguments and recall that the results of Cleary’s work (1999) are obtained using a 
larger sample and are consistent with their theory. 
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relationship with the firm: the bank now gains access to information about the firm while the firm 
enjoys better access to outside financial resources.  
A large flow of information about the firm arises from its utilizing a wide range of financial 
services offered by the bank. This information cannot be observed by, or transferred to, other banks, 
and the bank granting exclusive loans to the firm becomes the exclusive owner of such information. 
The free rider problems deriving from the public nature of the information are avoided and it 
follows that the bank will bear all the risks and at the same time will gain the benefits arising from 
its financial decisions. The close relationship enables the bank to support the growth of the firm 
with regard to its financial needs while, for the firm, benefits arising from the relationship generally 
consist in an increase in credit availability (Petersen, Rajan, 1994; Berger, Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; 
Boot, 2000) or a decrease in the interest rates and the collateral (Petersen, Rajan, 1994, Berger, 
Udell, 1998). Furthermore, the relationship ensures greater flexibility in the bank’s function as an 
intermediary that can subsidize the firm in adverse events and can be reimbursed in favorable years 
(Greenbaum et al., 1989; Boot, Thakor, 1994).  
From relationship lending there may also arise some disadvantages. The firm can be 
informationally “captured” by the bank (the so-called hold-up problem)4. The exclusive relationship 
involves monopolistic power by the bank. It can exploit this power by charging increasing interest 
rates on new loans or rationing additional borrowing. In this regard it can be shown that 
relationships with more than one bank can reduce its monopoly power (Von Thadden, 1995; 
Ongena, Smith, 2000) and also ensure greater availability of outside financial resources when there 
is a credit squeeze (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
The conclusions of the empirical analysis are ambiguous. The net gain of relationship lending 
seems to arise for the firm when the benefits of the informational advantage are not completely 
balanced by the costs of exploiting monopoly power. Recent theoretical developments suggest that 
the efficiency of the relationship is strictly dependent on bank competition as well (Boot, Thakor, 
2000; Dinç, 2000). According to this analysis, competitive pressure in the local credit market drives 
the bank to use financing relationships strategically to exploit information advantages. By contrast, 
the incumbent banks are unable to preserve their position when this informational advantage is 
unimportant and the profitability of the incumbents is diminishing (Hauswald, Marquez, 2006; 
Zarutskie, 2006). 
  
  
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
The data for the empirical analysis were obtained from the surveys of Italian manufacturing 
SMEs. In the past such surveys were carried out every three years and conducted through both 
interviews and balance sheet data. The surveys contain information related to several sections with 
regard to company employment, R&D expenditures, innovations and investment, 
internationalization, markets and finance; balance sheet data comprise both reclassified revenue 
statements and asset and liability statements. 
The firm sample for the survey is representative of the size and geographical composition of the 
universe of manufacturing firms. It consists of firms with more than 10 employees and is stratified 
by the productivity index (value added per employee). The total sample is defined according to the 
Neyman formula with reference to the individual strata, and the cross-industry composition is 
determined in proportion to the universe5. 
                                                 
4
 For the purpose of this analysis the opposite case in which the bank is captured by the firm (so-called soft budget 
constraint problem) does not appear relevant to us. 
  
5
 The surveys were carried out by the research centers of various public and private banks and supported by the Italian 
Ministry of Industry. The first surveys were conducted by the public bank Mediocredito Centrale, the last survey by the 
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We defined two balanced firm samples related to the two six-year periods 2001-2006 and 1998-
2003. They contain the observations referring to the same firms in the adjacent surveys, that is the 
1998-2000 and 2001-2003 surveys and 2001-2003 and 2004-2006 surveys, respectively. Next, we 
dropped the large firms with more than 250 employees. Consequently, the two closed samples were 
formed by SMEs with 10-250 employees and include 1134 observations for 1998-2003 and 823 
observations for 2001-20066. 
We then identified the firms belonging to the backward regions of Italy, on the one hand, and the 
firms with a close relationship with the main bank, on the other. In the former case, we established 
that firms operating in backward regions were those with plants in southern Italy, the so-called 
Mezzogiorno (MEZ)7. This area is known to have significantly lower overall development 
conditions compared with the more advanced developed regions in northern and central Italy. There 
were 135 such firms (11.9% of total observations) in the 1998-2003 sample, and 99 (12.0% of total 
observations) in the 2001-2006 sample. 
Next, we identified the firms with a stable relationship (STAB) with the main bank. In this 
regard, we utilized information from the “Finance” section of the surveys. We consider firms with a 
close banking relationship those that show with reference to both surveys: 
a) a debt share with the main bank equal to or greater than 30% of total debt; 
b) a relationship with the main bank dating back 15 years or more8. 
According to these criteria, 188 firms had a stable relationship with the main bank (16.6% of total 
observations) among the former sample, and 141 (17.1% of total observations) among the latter. 
Thus the information from the surveys as much as the balance sheet data was used to create the 
dataset for econometric analysis. 
We provided estimates in accordance with Arellano-Bond’s Dynamic Panel Data method (DPD) 
which is able to ensure a satisfactory solution to the endogeneity problem arising from the 
correlation between the fixed effects and the independent variables. This method involves the 
transformation of all the variables into first order differences in order to drop the fixed effects. Next, 
it suggests application of the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) and inclusion of valid 
instruments for every moment. Therefore the transformed variables are not generally correlated 
with the fixed effect starting at time t=2 (if the start time is t=0). From this time the lagged values 
can be used as instrumental variables for the GMM estimate.    
The choice of the empirical model with which to verify the investment-cash flow relationship 
characterizes the different approaches. Since a positive relationship can be interpreted as evidence 
of good opportunities for the firm, initial analyses resort to Tobin’s Q theory. These empirical 
specifications suggest controlling for the opportunities through the Q ratio and hence estimating the 
standard relationship between capital expenditures and the Q measure augmented by cash flow 
variables. Thus excess sensitivity of investment spending to cash flow indicates that more funds 
from inside resources are made available for investment when the firm is unlikely to make 
provision for its own needs from outside finance. Many objections can be raised against this 
approach; for example, if Tobin’s Q is not a good proxy of a firm’s opportunities, then excess 
                                                                                                                                                                  
private Unicredit Bank. Although some changes were made, the surveys retained their usual structure. In the last survey 
(2003-2006) the sample was extended to the service industry. 
     
6
 The upper limit corresponds with the employment criterion fixed by the EU for SMEs. However, the definition of 
SME by European statistics is more complex because it also considers levels of sales. 
   
7
 The Mezzogiorno comprises the southern area of Italy and is formed by eight administrative regions: Abruzzo, Molise, 
Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata, Sicily and Sardinia. 
  
8
 We alternatively proved a higher share of the main bank’s debt equal to or greater than 50% of total debt, but the 
econometric results are unchanged. 
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sensitivity of capital expenditure to cash flow does not necessarily indicate that financial constraints 
are binding9. 
The alternative approach is proposed by the Euler equation, that is the first order condition of the 
optimization problem of the inter-temporal income flows of the firm. This approach is able to 
prevent many questions arising from the Q approach because it is founded on the hypothesis of 
perfect functioning of the capital market. When this hypothesis fails to hold, then the imperfections 
in the capital markets arise and the firms face financial constraints. Many of the cited works choose 
the approach of the Euler equation10. 
    
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
For the empirical analysis we follow the Bond-Meghir model (Bond, Meghir, 1994). This model 
involves Euler’s investment function arising from the dynamic optimization of the present value of 
the expected net earnings function with the symmetric squared adjustment cost. The net earnings 
function is constrained by the capital accumulation function. If the condition of perfect competition 
holds, the constrained optimization function means that we can write Euler’s investment equation 
without financial constraints. Empirical estimation of the investment function makes it possible to 
test the ex ante conditions in order to ascertain whether there are constraints; if the ex-ante 
conditions do not hold, then it cannot be excluded that financial constraints are binding (see the 
APPENDIX). 
  From Euler’s investment equation the following empirical version of the investment equation 
can be derived: 
 
(I/K)t,i =β1(I/K)t-1,i+β2(I/K)2t-1,i+β3(CF/K)t-1,i+β4(Y/K)t-1,i+β5(D/K)2t-1,i+dt+ηi + ut,i 
 
where I is the investment expenditure, K the capital stock, CF the cash flow, Y the sales, D the total 
debt, d and η the time and individual effects, respectively, and u the stochastic term.   
We use this version of the empirical equation to investigate two different questions. First, we are 
interested in mapping the regional differences concerning the financing of investment expenditures. 
In this regard we assume that between the investment functions of firms in the various regions there 
are no technological differences except for the financing composition of their expenditure. We will 
test our hypothesis that the contribution of inside finance for firms in backward southern regions is 
greater compared to firms based in other Italian regions. In order to capture this effect we introduce 
in the previous empirical model an interaction variable between the cash flow and the dummy 
MEZZ; this latter variable has a value of 1 for southern Italian firms and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Second, we will verify the hypothesis according to which the presence of close relationships of 
the firm with the main bank significantly relaxes financially binding constraints. In order to test the 
difference with regard to the sensibility of investment spending to cash flow, we introduce into the 
previous empirical model an interaction variable between the cash flow variable and the dummy 
                                                 
9
 According to Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), there are three reasons giving rise to skepticism: a) Tobin’s Q 
contains less information about the younger, smaller and fastest growing firms because the markets are unable to gather 
information; b) if Q is not varying among firms, then the investment-cash flow relationship can result in a higher 
sensitivity to firm’s revenues rather than the existence of financial constraints; c) the relationship should result in a 
swifter reaction of the younger and smaller firms with regard to variations in investment opportunities (Gilchrist, 
Himmelberg, 1995; pp. 544-545). 
 
10
 Many objections can also be raised against the Euler equation approach. For example, it is unable to compare results 
from different studies because it is a reduced form model. Moreover, the estimates are excessively sensitive to the 
empirical specification of the model, particularly for samples of smaller firms. Finally, it imposes restrictions for every 
period and fails to consider that financially unconstrained firms today can be constrained tomorrow. 
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STAB. The latter variable is able to distinguish the firms with relationship banking from other firms 
according to previously set criteria; it assumes a value of 1 when firms have close relationships with 
their main bank, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 contains the main features of the sample firms with reference to size and profitability, 
capital structure and a number of key factors characterizing relationship banking. They are 
presented so as to outline the localization and the relationship with banks of the sample firms. With 
regard to the former (see columns [a] and [b]), it can be appreciated that firms in the Mezzogiorno 
are smaller and less profitable than those elsewhere in Italy. Moreover, they have higher debt both 
on sales and on assets, a higher share of short-term maturity, but debt share on equity is lower. 
Finally, they are younger and hence their relationship with the main bank is less old than other 
Italian firms in spite of the fact that both the debt share of the main bank and the multiple 
relationships are not different. With reference to the latter (see columns [c] and [d]), it can be seen 
that firms enjoying stable relationships with the main bank are smaller and older. Their ROE is no 
different compared to other firms besides the ROI is significantly lower while the weight of the debt 
in the capital structure is systematically greater. Finally, the scenario depicted for the two three-year 
periods confirms that the positive trend of export-driven production of Italian firms is close to an 
end and that this has reduced the weight of the debt, presumably raising the flows of inside 
resources available to finance both firms’ current activities and investments.  
Hence the estimating equation can be represented as follows: 
              
(I/K)t,i = β1(I/K)t-1,i+ β2(I/K)2t-1,i+ β3(CF/K)t-1,i+ β4(Y/K)t-1,i+ β5(D/K)2t-1,i+ δMEZZ*(CF/K)t-1,i + 
γSTAB*(CF/K)t-1,i +dt+ηi+ut,i 
   
The variables are expressed as logarithms and are determined as follows: gross fixed investment 
(I) is obtained directly from the surveys11; capital stock (K) is equal to annual net fixed assets; cash 
flow (CF) is calculated as the sum of gross earnings and the depreciation of the fixed assets; net 
sales (Y) is equal to net revenue; total debt (D) is equal to the sum of annual short-term liabilities 
and medium-long term liabilities.  
The estimates are obtained following the Arellano-Bond method for dynamic panels according to 
the first difference variables are involved as instrument of the GMM estimates12. In the empirical 
model dummy variables are introduced for temporal effects. 
In Table 2 statistics and correlation matrices of both six-year samples are shown. Estimates of 
the investment equations are contained in Table 3. Besides the F test, for each equation the Sargan 
test and the AR tests are reported. The former test of overidentification verifies that the instrument 
number is not excessive. The latter tests investigate the autocorrelation between the independent 
variable and the fixed effects; in this regard it may be expected that the AR[1] test does not exclude 
the presence of autocorrelation, while the contrary should hold for the AR[2] test. These tests 
always meet expectations. 
Columns [1] and [3] show the estimates of the investment equations related to overall firms for 
the periods 1998-2003 and 2001-2006, respectively. The conditions of the models generally hold, 
but the former equation performs better than the latter. The coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable are positive, whereas the coefficients of its lagged value are negative and lower than 
                                                 
11
 In most studies the investment data are obtained as “library value”; instead, we use data on the fixed investment 
obtained directly from the inquiries. The interviews indicate the amount of net fixed investment (plant and equipment, 
hardware and software, information and innovation technology) in the years of the survey. 
 
12
 For the estimate we use the STATA 8.0 package that contains an apposite procedure for the dynamic panel estimate 
according to the Arellano-Bond method. 
 
8 
 
unity13. The coefficients related to the debt variables are negative and lower than unity; they are 
compatible with the hypothesis of the presence of taxes and distress costs in the former equation, 
but they are not significant in the latter equation. The coefficients of sales variables are positive; the 
accelerating effect is higher in the former equation and dramatically lower in the latter. Both these 
outcomes indicate the prevailing trend toward the deceleration of the debt weight and the rise of 
inside resource devoted to finance firm growth due to sustained performance of the previous years. 
At the same time, this improvement in the capital structure of the firm is counterbalanced by a 
negative trend of production caused by intensified competitive pressure on international markets 
and by a dramatic decrease in national exports.   
Finally, the cash flow coefficients are negative with reference to all the sample firms, indicating 
that financial constraints are not important. Columns [2] and [5] report the estimates of the 
investment equations including the interaction cash flow variable MEZZ*(CF/K) devoted to 
capturing the impact of internal finance on capital expenditures in southern Italian firms. The 
estimates confirm the previous results because the coefficient remains negative; it may be noted that 
while the variations of the other coefficients are not significant, the cash flow value is significantly 
higher. Furthermore, the cash–flow coefficient becomes positive and higher when it refers to the 
interaction variable of southern firm observations. Since this variable measures the difference of the 
impact of inside finance on investment in southern firms, it may be stated that while the coefficients 
referring to the overall sample are negative, equal to -0.17 and -2.81 for the two six-year periods 
respectively, the one referring to the southern firms is positive and approximately equal to +0.21 
and +2.54, respectively in 1998-2003 and 2001-2006. This indicates excess sensitivity of 
investment expenditures to cash flow for southern firms14.      
Finally, the estimates including the interaction variable related to the presence of relationship 
banking STAB*(CF/K) are reported in columns [3] and [6]. As can be seen, while the previous 
results are confirmed with reference to the remaining coefficients, the cash flow coefficients related 
to the overall firm become positive and they remain significant: the values are equal to +0.14 for the 
former six-year period coefficient and +0.12 for the latter six-year coefficient. However, this excess 
sensitivity of investment expenditure is mitigated by the effect of relationship banking. The 
coefficients related to the interaction variable are negative; the value in the former equation is -1.17, 
that of the latter equation -1.04. The net effect is approximately the same in both cases. Therefore, 
relationship lending appears to relax the pressure on inside resources, improving the liquidity 
conditions of the firms. According to our empirical outcomes it can be said that the benefits of the 
relationship tend to significantly overcome the effects of the financial constraints arising from the 
typical information opacity of the SMEs. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is commonly believed that SMEs face greater obstacles in obtaining the necessary outside 
resources to finance their growth. This paper provided some further evidence in this regard with 
reference to a sample of Italian SMEs. We adopted the well-known approach according to which 
the sensitivity of the investment expenditures to inside finance may suggest that financial 
constraints to company growth are binding. We ascertained through the estimate of Euler’s 
investment equation the sensitivity of investment on firm’s cash flow variables and we also 
investigated two related questions: to what extent financial constraints are more binding for firms in 
backward regions and then whether relationship lending can significantly mitigate their effects.  
                                                 
13
 The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the first equation is no different from unity (Student’s t is equal at 
-1,2), but the same coefficient in the second equation related to 2001-2006 years is significantly different from unity 
(Student’s t is - 19.2). 
 
14
 The southern firm coefficient is the overall sample coefficient and the interaction variable coefficient.  
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Our conclusions are as follows. First, with reference to our sample firms there is no confirmation 
from econometric analysis that investment expenditures show excess sensitivity to company cash 
flow. Second, we found sensitivity of investment to inside finance instead for firms in the backward 
regions of southern Italy. In this case there is no sound reason which justifies the ambiguity in the 
economic literature as regards interpretation of such sensitivity, namely that it can prove the 
existence of both financial constraints and good investment opportunities. In this regard we 
provided evidence that firms in backward regions perform less well, are financially weaker and 
therefore have fewer opportunities compared to firms in more developed regions. Our empirical 
analysis confirmed that in backward regions a firm’s growth is constrained by inside financial 
resources, or that it is more dependent on inside finance than elsewhere. Finally, we proved that the 
information advantages arising from relationship lending considerably relax asymmetry effects and 
significantly mitigate financial constraints, reducing the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
cash flow. This empirical outcome appears consistent with the events related to the latest financial 
crisis in which small local banks enjoying close relationships with firms played an important role in 
SME growth.   
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7. APPENDIX 
 
Bond-Meghir’s model can be represented by an investment function derived from the dynamic 
optimization of the present value of the expected cash flow with symmetric squared adjustment cost 
function. The constrained optimization problem is  
Max Et [∑
∞
=0j
βt+j Πt (·) ] 
where E is the conditional expectation on the information available at time t, β is the nominal 
discount factor between t and t+j  and Π
 
 is net earnings15.
 
The constraint is represented by the capital accumulation function 
   
Kt+1 = (1-δ)Kt + It. 
 
where K is capital stock, δ depreciation rate and I  investment.  
The function of net earnings is  
 
Πt = ptF(Kt,Lt) - pt1/2bKt [(I/K)t - c]2 - wt Lt - pIt It 
 
where L is the labour input, pI
 
 is the capital price, p is the output price, w is the labour price.  
F(Kt,Lt) is the production function with constant returns to scale while 1/2bKt[(I/K)t-c]2 indicates 
the adjustment cost function that is linearly homogeneous in K and L variables. The hypothesis of 
perfect competition conditions holds; therefore p (the price of the firm’s output) is dependent on the 
output through demand elasticity (ε>1), that is constant. 
The derivatives of the previous equation with respect to I and to K are, respectively, 
 
(∂Πt/∂It) = - bapt (I/K)t + bcapt - pIt 
 
and 
 
(∂δΠt/∂Kt) =  apt (Y/K)t - apt (∂Πt/∂Kt) (L/K)t + bapt (I/K)t2 - bcapt (I/K)t 
 
where Y=F–G
   
is the net sales of the firm while a=[1-(1/ε)]>016. 
The Euler equation without financial constraints is 
 
(I/K)t+1=c(1-φt+1)+(1+c)φt+1(I/K)t-φt+1(I/K)t2-φt+1/ba(CF/K)t+φt+1/baJt+ φt+1/b(ε-1) (Y/K)t - 
[(1+rt)vt/b(1-δ)a] (D/K)t2 + vt+1 
 
where,  φt+1=(1+ρt+1)/(1- δ), (1+ρt+1)=(1+rt)(pt/pt+1), ρt+1  is the real discount rate, (CF/K)t=(ptYt–
wtLt)/(pt Kt) is the ratio between the real cash flow and the capital stock, Jt=(pIt/pt) {1-pIt+1(1-
δ)/[(1+rt) pIt]}  is the user cost capital, (D/K)t2=(pIt/pt+1)[(Dt/pItK)t2  is the debt ratio while vt+1  is  
the error term. 
                                                 
15
 β is equal to 1/(1+r) where r is the expected yield. The operator E is the expectation conditional on the information 
available at initial period t; the expectation is related to the interest rate, the input and output prices and the technology. 
 
16
 The derivative on K is based on the assumption that Yt is homogeneous on (Kt,Lt). Moreover, the labor marginal 
productivity (∂F/∂L) can be substituted by the first order condition (w/ap); this allows us to avoid specifying the 
parametric form of the production function. 
 
14 
 
We assume that the real discount rate [φt+1], net sales and the debt ratio coefficients are constant 
over time and across firms, and are therefore parameters.  
The hypothesis of the model is satisfied if it happens ex post that the forward investment rate 
coefficient [(1+c)φt+1] is greater than or equal to 1, the forward squared investment rate coefficient 
[-φt+1 ] is negative and lower than 1 in absolute value. 
Moreover, it may happen that the coefficient [φt+1/ba], that is the same for the forward cash flow 
rate and for the user cost of the capital, is negative; the forward net sales coefficient [φt+1 / b(ε -1)] 
is positive (or equal to 0 if the perfect competition hypothesis holds). The expectation about the sign 
of the debt variable coefficient [vt] is not certain: if the Modigliani-Miller propositions hold, then it 
is equal to 0, while in the opposite case, it is positive. However, if there are taxes and bankruptcy 
costs, then it is negative.  
The empirical specification of the investment function is as follows 
   
(I/K)t,i =β1(I/K)t-1,i+β2(I/K)2t-1,i+β3(CF/K)t-1,i+β4(Y/K)t-1,i+β5(D/K)2t-1,i+dt+ηi+ut,i 
          
 
where dt  are time effects, ηi  individual effects and ut,i is a stochastic time term for individual 
observations. 
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TABLE 1 - MAIN FEATURES OF SAMPLE FIRMS (mean  of median values) 
1998-2003 years 2001-2006 years 
[a] [b] [c] [d] [a] [b] [c] [d] 
 
 ITALIAN   
FIRMS 
MEZZOGIORNO  
FIRMS 
FIRMS WITH 
RELATIONSHIP 
FIRMS 
WITHOUT 
RELATIONSHIP  
 ITALIAN   
FIRMS 
MEZZOGIORNO  
FIRMS 
FIRMS WITH 
RELATIONSHIP 
FIRMS 
WITHOUT 
RELATIONSHIP 
FIRM SIZE 
sales ('000 €) 13,2 13,4 11,4 14,1 14,6 13,6 12,5 15,5 
employment  (units) 82,2 67,5 77,0 84,5 80,3 73,2 78,3 82,5 
FIRM PROFITABILITY 
return on equity  15,6 5,7 12,6 16,2 11,2 3,8 6,4 13,0 
return on investment 5,1 3,8 5,4 5,1 4,7 3,0 4,3 4,7 
FIRM CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
total debt on sales (%) 24,2 31,1 25,8 23,8 19,9 29,5 24,9 18,3 
bank debt on total debt (%) 77,9 81,2 81,4 77,4 83,6 83,5 86,3 82,6 
short-term bank debt on total debt (%) 50,0 53,3 54,1 48,8 49,1 52,6 53,8 47,4 
total debt on equity (%) 392,3 354,9 424,0 384,4 267,6 252,6 322,5 256,4 
total debt on assets (%) 112,4 95,5 122,1 107,8 74,2 87,7 101,5 67,8 
FIRM-BANK RELATIONSHIP 
age (years) 28 18 31 27 31 21 34 30 
main bank debt on total debt (%) 20 20 40 10 20 20 40 10 
number of banks (units) 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 
age of main bank relationship (years) 20 15 25 20 20 15 25 20 
lenght of branch from head main bank  
(KM) 5 9 6 4 5 9 6 4 
 
Notes:  Statistics are expressed as  mean values of the individual median values related to two six years. In the column [a] there are the statistics of the firms of the whole sample; in the column [b] there 
are the statistics of Mezzogiorno’s firms. In the column [c] there are the statistics related to the firm having a closed relationship with the main bank while in column [c] there are statistic of the firms 
having not a closed relationship with the banks.The Mezzogiorno is the area of South Italy formed by the administrative regions of Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and 
Sardegna. All the regions with the exception of Abruzzo are in the area classified as Objective 1 and are benefiting of economic development and cohesion policies of the UE. 
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TABLE 2 - STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRICES 
2003-1998 YEARS 
STATISTICS 
Average S.D. Min. Max. 
(I_K) 0,9 1,3 0,0 4,6 
(I_K)2 2,5 4,8 0,0 21,2 
(CF_K) 3,6 1,5 0,0 17,0 
(Y_K) 6,5 1,1 0,0 11,5 
(D_K)2 37,0 13,0 0,0 121,0 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
(I_K) (I_K)2 (CF_K) (Y_K) (D_K)2 
(I_K) 1,000 
(I_K)2 0,968 1,000 
(CF_K) 0,047 0,074 1,000 
(Y_K) 0,005 0,042 0,544 1,000 
(D_K)2 -0,030 0,006 0,414 0,901 1,000 
2006-2001 YEARS 
STATISTICS 
Average S.D. Min. Max. 
(I_K) 9,3 11,2 0,0 32,9 
(I_K)2 211,4 353,8 0,0 1085,7 
(CF_K) 42,9 41,7 0,0 133,3 
(Y_K) 611,2 446,5 163,3 1549,2 
(D_K)2 142424,4 182044,7 9569,4 577864,8 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
(I_K) (I_K)2 (CF_K) (Y_K) (D_K)2 
(I_K) 1,000 
(I_K)2 0,959 1,000 
(CF_K) 0,204 0,215 1,000 
(Y_K) 0,147 0,182 0,620 1,000 
(D_K)2 0,067 0,102 0,397 0,826 1,000 
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TABLE 3 –  INVESTIMENTS-CASH FLOW RELATIONSHIP ESTIMATES 
1998-2003 years 2001-2006 years 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
(I / K)
-1 0,755 0,778 0,781 0,316 0,326 0,289 
[.191]*** [.193]*** [.205]*** [.060]*** [.073]*** [.088]*** 
(I / K)2
-1 -0,128 -0,136 -0,134 -0,006 -0,007 -0,006 
[.047]*** [.048]*** [.051]*** [.002]*** [-.002]*** [.003]** 
(CF / K)
-1 -0,063 -0,145 0,141 -0,018 -0,071 0,121 
[.032]** [.048]*** [.072]** [.008]** [-.017]*** [.039]*** 
(Y / K)
-1 0,469 0,486 0,483 0,003 0,005 0,006 
[.212]** [.214]** [.227]** [.001]** [.002]*** [.002]** 
(D / K)2
-1 -0,048 -0,048 -0,050 -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 
[.019]** [.019]** [.020]** [.000] [.000] [.000] 
MEZZ*(CF / K)
-1 0,327 1,116 
[.140]** [.178]*** 
STAB*(CF / K)
-1 -1,169 -1,044 
[.366]*** [.173]*** 
F 262,4*** 301,2*** 267,2*** 22,7*** 18,3*** 12.5*** 
Sargan Test 191,4*** 183,2*** 156,8*** 2924,9*** 1940,7*** 1029,3*** 
AR(1) -15,9*** -15,6*** -14,7*** -18,4*** -9,36*** -6.8*** 
AR(2) 1,4 0,7 -1,3 -1,3 -0,9 -1.4 
n° Obs 4188 4188 4188 2868 2868 2868 
 
 
 
Notes: Variables are: I=Investment, K=Capital Stock, CF=cash flow, Y=sales and D=Total Financial Debt; MEZZ is dummy with unity value if the firm is belonging in 
Mezzogiorno’s regions and zero value otherwise; STAB is the dummy with unity value if the firm is involving a closed relationship with main bank and zero value otherwise. 
The estimates are obtained through the GMM method; standard errors are in brackets; *,**,*** are indicating statistical significance of the coefficients at 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively.  
 
 
